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How speakers adapt object descriptions to listeners under load
Jorrig Vogels a, David M. Howcroft b, Elli Tourtouri b and Vera Demberg b,c
aFaculty of Arts, Semantics and Cognition— Neurolinguistics and Language Development, Center for Language and Cognition, University of
Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands; bDepartment of Language Science and Technology, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany;
cDepartment of Mathematics and Computer Science, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
ABSTRACT
A controversial issue in psycholinguistics is the degree to which speakers employ audience design
during language production. Hypothesising that a consideration of the listener’s needs is
particularly relevant when the listener is under cognitive load, we had speakers describe objects
for a listener performing an easy or a diﬃcult simulated driving task. We predicted that speakers
would introduce more redundancy in their descriptions in the diﬃcult driving task, thereby
accommodating the listener’s reduced cognitive capacity. The results showed that speakers did
not adapt their descriptions to a change in the listener’s cognitive load. However, speakers who
had experienced the driving task themselves before and who were presented with the diﬃcult
driving task ﬁrst were more redundant than other speakers. These ﬁndings may suggest that
speakers only consider the listener’s needs in the presence of strong enough cues, and do not
update their beliefs about these needs during the task.
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For successful communication, it is important that
speaker and listener have established a common
ground (Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). For
example, a speaker saying “please give me the green
chair” needs to have made sure, among other things,
that there is an object near the listener that can be
uniquely identiﬁed by the referring expression “the
green chair”. If the listener sees only one chair, mention-
ing “green” is redundant; if the listener sees more than
one green chair, the expression may be underspeciﬁed.
An important question is whether and how speakers
adapt referring expressions to their listener’s perspective.
This type of adaptation is generally called audience
design, and there has been a long debate about the
degree to which speakers employ audience design
when making linguistic choices. It is generally accepted
that speakers adapt their language to their addressee’s
perspective at least at a crude level (e.g. Galati &
Brennan, 2010), but it is less clear which cues trigger
speakers to explicitly consider the listener’s needs.
This paper is concerned with the case where a speaker
must uniquely identify a referent for a listener who is
experiencing an increased cognitive load. The processing
capacity of addressees is likely to vary inversely with their
extralinguistic cognitive load. For instance, when an
addressee is performing a secondary task while receiving
a message, this task will reduce their processing capacity,
leaving less capacity for processing the information in
the message. If speakers are sensitive to the cognitive
load of their listeners, they should adapt their language
use to remain comprehensible. If speakers do not take
into account their listeners’ cognitive state, no adap-
tation is expected when the listener is under increased
cognitive load. There are diﬀerent views in the psycholin-
guistic literature on the degree to which speakers take
their addressee’s needs into account in their referential
choices, to which we will now turn.
Addressee-oriented and egocentric views of
reference production
According to the addressee-oriented view on reference
production (e.g. Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark, 1996;
Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), cooperative speakers
include as much information as needed for the listener
to pick out the correct referent. The idea that speakers
take into account the informativeness of their utterances
for their addressee is expressed by Grice’s (1975) Maxim
of Quantity: (1) Make your contribution as informative as
is required, but (2) do not make your contribution more
informative than is required. Such inferences made by
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the speaker about how informative an utterance will be
for the listener are incorporated in some theories of
referring expression production, which assume that in
selecting a referring expression speakers take into
account how the listener will interpret it (e.g. Gundel,
Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Hendriks, 2016), as well as
in information-theoretic models of pragmatic reasoning
such as the Rational Speech Act model (Frank &
Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016). Within the
psycholinguistic literature on reference, there is evidence
that speakers are at least moderately Gricean. For
example, speakers reduce referring expressions when
they refer repeatedly to the same object while speaking
to the same addressee (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Horton & Gerrig, 2005), but can
adapt relatively quickly to a new addressee who is not
yet familiar with the object (Galati & Brennan, 2010;
Gann & Barr, 2014). In addition, speakers have been
found to shorten the duration of parts of their descrip-
tion in response to characteristics of the listener (e.g.
Arnold, Kahn, & Pancani, 2012; Rosa, Finch, Bergeson, &
Arnold, 2015).
However, other research has emphasised that speak-
ers are not always Gricean (e.g. Bard et al., 2000; Dell &
Brown, 1991; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). For example,
speakers often refer to information that is not available
to their addressee (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Wardlow
Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006), and they overspecify
their references in cases where this is not considered
beneﬁcial for the listener (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira,
2006; Koolen, Gatt, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2011). It has
been suggested that maintaining a detailed mental
model of the addressee’s needs is cognitively costly
(Bard et al., 2000; Dell & Brown, 1991; Goudbeek &
Krahmer, 2011; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Rossnagel,
2000), and generally not very eﬃcient, given that the
speaker’s and the listener’s knowledge are often closely
aligned (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Galati & Brennan,
2010). Hence, speakers could use their own knowledge
as a proxy for their addressee’s (Pickering & Garrod,
2004). There is also empirical evidence that speakers
base referential choices mainly on their own model of
the discourse rather than on an explicit consideration
of the listener’s perspective (e.g. Bard & Aylett, 2005;
Fukumura & van Gompel, 2012; Vogels, Krahmer, &
Maes, 2015). Thus, despite the ﬁndings suggesting
speaker adaptation in reference, reference production
may still be at least partly insensitive to the listener’s per-
spective; speakers seem to often produce referring
expressions based on their own, egocentric preferences.
In sum, it is generally accepted that speakers can and
do adapt referring expressions to their addressees’
needs, but which cues are instrumental in triggering
such adaptive behaviour is still poorly understood. The
question, then, is which situations trigger perspective
taking in reference production, and which do not. One
possibility is that speakers only take into account the
addressee’s knowledge in their referring expressions
when there is a clear risk of misinterpretation or when
it is very important that the message be understood cor-
rectly (e.g. Arts, Maes, Noordman, & Jansen, 2011;
Watson, Arnold, & Tanenhaus, 2008; but cf. Jucks,
Becker, & Bromme, 2008). For instance, Arts and col-
leagues found that speakers produced more overspe-
ciﬁed descriptions of geometrical objects when they
were told that they were engaged in a long-distance
surgery than when no cover story was given. In addition,
speakers have been found to produce longer descrip-
tions when addressees are distracted (Rosa et al., 2015;
but cf. Kuhlen & Brennan, 2010). Therefore, speakers
may employ audience design whenever there are
strong enough cues that adaptation is necessary to
ensure successful communication (e.g. Fukumura & van
Gompel, 2012; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
However, one problem in investigating audience
design is that it is diﬃcult to know when the use of a
certain linguistic form constitutes evidence for taking
into account the listener’s perspective and when it
does not. For example, according to the Maxim of Quan-
tity producing an overspeciﬁed description is not coop-
erative, since it gives more information than necessary,
and hence overspeciﬁcations have been considered evi-
dence of egocentricity (Engelhardt et al., 2006). On the
other hand, an increase in the number of overspeciﬁca-
tions has also been taken to reﬂect audience design
where it occurred after a change in the communicative
situation (see the Arts et al., 2011 study on referring
expressions in a long-distance surgery cited above).
Uniform information density
To provide us with a clear prediction of what listener
adaptation in referential descriptions should look like lin-
guistically, we turn to the Uniform Information Density
hypothesis (UID; e.g. Levy & Jaeger, 2007). According to
UID, speakers strive to distribute information equally
across their utterances. To this end, they are predicted
to make linguistic choices (where more than one alterna-
tive is permitted by the grammar of the language) that
maximise the amount of information conveyed to a lis-
tener within a threshold of comprehensibility, also
known as the channel capacity. In Information Theory,
the channel capacity is deﬁned as the rate at which infor-
mation can be transmitted successfully (Shannon, 1948).
In principle, channel capacity depends on every aspect of
the channel, from its conception in the speaker’s mind to
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its interpretation by the listener (Jaeger, 2010). For our
purposes, we consider channel capacity at the receiver’s
end, and take it to be the amount of cognitive resources
available to the listener for processing linguistic material.
In general, speakers like to be parsimonious (the Principle
of least eﬀort; Zipf, 1949), and hence strive to transmit as
much information as possible with the least possible
eﬀort. However, a rate of information transmission
exceeding the channel capacity may result in infor-
mation loss. It follows that information is distributed opti-
mally for both speaker and listener when its rate of
transmission is uniformly close to the channel capacity,
but not exceeding it.
There is an increasing amount of evidence that UID is
an important force driving linguistic choices in language
production (e.g. Jaeger, 2010; Mahowald, Fedorenko,
Piantadosi, & Gibson, 2013; Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson,
2012), but it is not yet clear what underlies this behaviour
in speakers. Although UID itself is agnostic about the
degree to which speakers’ linguistic choices are motiv-
ated by audience design, one intuitive possibility is
that speakers try to minimise listeners’ processing
diﬃculty. Peaks in information density may cause
interpretation problems (e.g. Van Berkum, 2008;
Demberg & Keller, 2008; Federmeier, McLennan, De
Ochoa, & Kutas, 2002; Jaeger & Tily, 2011; Levy, 2008;
Kutas, DeLong, & Smith, 2011; Smith & Levy, 2013;
Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015), and keeping information
density uniform close to the channel capacity ensures
that listeners will not be overloaded by information.
For reference production, UID predicts that parts of a
referential description that have a high information
density will be spread out over more time, whereas
material that has a relatively low information density
will be reduced. Indeed, research has shown that
where speakers overspecify, the redundant information
is shorter in duration than the same information in a
minimally speciﬁed reference (Engelhardt & Ferreira,
2014). Moreover, redundant information that results in
a more uniform reduction of referential entropy (i.e.
how many possible referents there are at a certain
point in a description) seems to reduce the listener’s pro-
cessing eﬀort (Tourtouri, Delogu, & Crocker, 2017).
Crucially, if speakers are sensitive to the processing
capacity of their addressees, they should also adjust
the overall information density of their utterances to a
level that they expect the addressee to be able to
process. More speciﬁcally, they should introduce more
redundancy in their referring expressions when the lis-
tener is experiencing an increased cognitive load.
Hence, we hypothesise that, when the addressee is
involved in a diﬃcult task that is noticeably reducing
their cognitive capacity, speakers will produce more
overspeciﬁed referential descriptions, thereby distribut-
ing distinguishing (and therefore more informative)
content over more linguistic units, and hence reducing
the overall information density of their utterances. This
may help the addressee in selecting the correct referent
in the diﬃcult task, because he will have more time and
more linguistic cues to identify the referent.
In contrast, an alternative strategy that speakers may
employ to aid their addressee is to minimise the time
that they disturb the listener, using as short descriptions
as possible. This would mean that the information
density of their descriptions would actually increase
when the listener is under load. Finally, it could be the
case that speakers do not adapt to the needs of listeners
under load at all, or perhaps only when they have a
simple but compelling cue that adaptation is necessary,
for example when they have experienced the same cog-
nitive load themselves.
The current study
To investigate these hypotheses, we conducted an
experiment in which pairs of participants performed a
referential communication task. One participant, the
speaker, described objects for the listener, who was per-
forming a secondary driving task in a driving simulator.
Driving is a complex cognitive task, and it has been
shown that listening or talking and driving at the same
time can seriously impact driving performance
(Demberg, Sayeed, Mahr, & Müller, 2013; Drews, Pasu-
pathi, & Strayer, 2008). Conversely, there is also some evi-
dence that driving has an impact on language
comprehension and production (Becic et al., 2010; Engo-
nopoulos, Sayeed, & Demberg, 2013). In our dual task
setting, the listener (henceforth called the “listener-
driver”) was behind the wheel in a driving simulator,
while the speaker (henceforth called the “speaker-pas-
senger”) was in the passenger seat and described an
object amidst several other objects, appearing above
the road on the simulator screen. The listener-driver’s
task was to identify the object that was referred to.
Extra-linguistic cognitive load of the listener was manipu-
lated by setting the driving task to either easy or diﬃcult.
In the easy condition, the listener-driver had a perfectly
straight road in front of him and had to do practically
no steering. In the diﬃcult condition, the listener-driver
had to use the steering wheel to keep two vertical bars
appearing on the road perfectly overlapping (the
ConTRe task; Mahr, Feld, Moniri, & Math, 2012). As the
ConTRe task has been shown to increase cognitive load
(Demberg et al., 2013), the listener-driver’s processing
capacity for incoming linguistic material will be
decreased during this task. The question is whether
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speakers are sensitive to this decrease in processing
capacity in performing the referential communication
task. Because speakers may only take into account their
listener’s cognitive state when they have concrete evi-
dence that it is diﬀerent from their own, and hence
cannot use a model of their own cognitive state as a
proxy, we had the speaker-passenger and the listener-
driver switch roles halfway through the experiment,
allowing us to investigate the inﬂuence of a speaker’s
ﬁrst-hand experience with the cognitively taxing task
on their later descriptions for someone performing that
same task.
To investigate how speakers accommodate their lis-
tener’s increased cognitive load in their referential
descriptions, we measured the degree of referential
overspeciﬁcation in these descriptions. Each object to
be referred to could be uniquely identiﬁed by mention-
ing either one or two properties (i.e. a minimal descrip-
tion), and expressions that used more properties than
that (i.e. mentioned redundant attributes) were con-
sidered overspeciﬁed (e.g. Koolen, Goudbeek, &
Krahmer, 2013). Redundant attributes were never fully
distinguishing. In addition, we analysed the general
information density (amount of information per linguistic
unit) of the descriptions, both as the number of words
per attribute and as the average word duration. We
also analysed the speech rate with which redundant
and non-redundant modiﬁers were produced within
overspeciﬁed descriptions. The rationale behind this
was that, given the prediction of UID that linguistic
material carrying less information will be reduced, redun-
dant attributes in the descriptions are likely to have a
speciﬁcally reduced pronunciation (Engelhardt & Fer-
reira, 2014). The rate of reduction may then be dimin-
ished when the addressee is under load. Furthermore,
we analysed the speaker-passenger’s speech onset
latency to determine whether speakers also take longer
to plan their description when they show signs of adap-
tation. Finally, we examined the listener-driver’s
response accuracy and driving accuracy, to see how
their performance was inﬂuenced by diﬀerent types of
descriptions.
We predicted that when listeners are under an
increased cognitive load, speakers decrease the infor-
mation density of their utterances. Generally, we pre-
dicted descriptions to become less informationally
dense in the diﬃcult driving task than in the easy
driving task, i.e. the same referential information is
spread out over more time or more words. More
speciﬁcally, we expected speaker-passengers to be
more redundant in their descriptions, and include
more modiﬁers than necessary in the diﬃcult than in
the easy driving task to give the listener-driver more
cues and more time to process the descriptions. Alter-
natively, if speakers shorten their descriptions so as to
cause as little disturbance to the driving task as poss-
ible, we would instead expect an increase in the infor-
mation density of the descriptions. If such changes in
either redundancy or description length are the result
of an eﬀortful process of audience design, we would
also expect speakers to take longer to plan their
descriptions, resulting in a longer speech onset
latency. In addition, if adaptation strategies are ben-
eﬁcial for listeners under load, we expect performance
on the referential task and/or on the driving task to be
better when descriptions are adapted to the listener.
Finally, if speakers take into account their listener’s
cognitive state only when they have concrete evi-
dence that it is diﬀerent from their own, we might
ﬁnd evidence for adaptation primarily in speaker-pas-
sengers who did the driving task ﬁrst compared to




Twenty-ﬁve pairs of Saarland University students, with
mean age 23.4 (SD 3.9), participated in our experiment
and were paid €10. Twenty-nine participants were
women and the rest were men. Two pairs did not
switch roles halfway through the experiment, resulting
in referring expression data for 48 participants in total.
All participants provided written consent and their data
were fully anonymised.
Materials
The stimulus materials were based on those used in
Koolen et al. (2011).1 They consisted of scenes containing
7 images in a 2 × 4 grid, where each grid position was
numbered 1–8 (i.e. one grid position remained empty).
The target image was identiﬁed for the speaker by
number, with this number appearing on a separate
display not visible to the driver. The images in a scene
were furniture, taken from the Object Databank pro-
duced by Michael Tarr’s lab.2 The image set in this
domain is highly systematic, consisting of four diﬀerent
object types (chair, sofa, desk, fan) in four diﬀerent
colours (blue, red, green, grey), four diﬀerent orientations
(front-, back-, left-, right-facing), and two diﬀerent sizes
(large, small). For the present experiment, we left out
the backward facing objects because we judged them
to be less clear in our particular setup, thus leaving us
with three diﬀerent orientations.
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We created 88 scenes, constructed in such a way that
either one (n = 36) or two (n = 52) modiﬁers were mini-
mally required for the listener to pick out the target
image. For example, in Figure 1, image #4 is identiﬁable
by the attributes “orientation = front” and “colour =
blue”, allowing for the minimal description der blaue Ven-
tilator, der nach vorne zeigt (“the blue fan facing front”). In
addition, we created 32 ﬁller items, which consisted of 8
items for which no attributes were required for a minimal
description, and 24 for which the mention of all three
attributes was needed, resulting in a total of 120 scenes.
Since every participant acted once as the speaker-pas-
senger and once as the listener-driver in the experiment,
we created two item lists to ensure that participants did
not see the same item twice. Each list consisted of 60
trials. The target images were selected such that all com-
binations of the minimally required attributes occurred
equally often on a list, and that the same image
appeared only once as the target referent. In addition,
we created 8 practice trials (the same on the two lists),
which were similar but not identical to the experimental
items.
Driving simulator
The experiment was run in a driving simulator consisting
of two front seats, dashboard, steering wheel and gas
and brake pedals taken from a real car. We used the
OpenDS 3.0 software (https://www.opends.dfki.de;
Math, Mahr, Moniri, & Müller, 2012) to provide the
driving environment, which was projected on three
large panels positioned in an approximately 180° curve
around the car (see Figure 2). The driver’s seat was
aligned with the centre of the middle panel. The presen-
tation of the stimuli was controlled from a separate PC
using the Experiment Builder software (https://www.sr-
research.com), which communicated with the driving
simulator software over a serial port connection. The
speaker-passenger received instructions regarding the
identity of the referent to be described via a second
display (an iPad) connected to the Experiment Builder
PC using duet display (https://www.duetdisplay.com/).
A microphone was mounted on the dashboard in front
of the passenger, and an Eyelink 1000 Plus eye tracker
was placed just behind the steering wheel. The eye
tracker was used to record the listener-driver’s eye move-
ments and pupil size as on-line measures of the linguistic
processing of the image descriptions. However, as the
current paper is concerned with linguistic choices in pro-
duction, we will not report on these measures here.
Procedure
Two participants were randomly assigned to the roles of
speaker-passenger and listener-driver using a coin toss.
The listener-driver sat in the driver’s position in the
driving simulator. The speaker-passenger then sat
down on the passenger seat and received an iPad. In
each trial the iPad displayed a number identifying a
target image to the speaker. The speaker-passenger’s
task was to describe the target image in such a way
that the listener-driver could identify the correct image
from among the distractor images. Speaker-passengers
were free to describe the images in any way they
wanted, except that they were told that they were not
allowed to use pointing or mention the target’s location
in the scene or its assigned number. Every ten trials, a
question about the perceived cognitive load of the lis-
tener-driver (Wie abgelenkt ﬁnden Sie den Fahrer jetzt?
“How distracted do you ﬁnd the driver at the
moment?”) appeared on the iPad for the speaker-passen-
ger to answer. This question was only intended to keep
the speaker-passenger aware of the cognitive state of
the listener-driver, and answers were not recorded.
Figure 1. Higher resolution version of an example stimulus with
minimal description length 2 to describe image #4.
Figure 2. The driving simulator used for this experiment.
Speaker-passengers described a target image from the image
array displayed above the road. Listener-drivers had to follow
the yellow bar back and forth across the road while identifying
the intended referent by number.
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The listener-driver’s task was to listen to the speaker-
passenger’s descriptions, and identify the correct refer-
ents in the scenes that appeared above the road in the
driving simulator. If the description was not clear, the lis-
tener-driver was allowed to ask for clariﬁcation. After
each trial, the listener-driver had to say aloud the
number of the referent based on the description pro-
vided. The experimenter then recorded this number.
Each trial had a time limit of 15 s, after which the next
trial was automatically started.
Besides the referential communication task, the lis-
tener-driver had to perform a secondary driving task sim-
ultaneously. There were two driving conditions: In the
easy driving condition, listener-drivers did not have to
do anything else but keeping the car straight on a
straight road. In the diﬃcult driving condition, listener-
drivers had to perform the ConTRe task while identifying
the referents. In this task, a blue and a yellow vertical bar
are present on the road directly in front of the driver, at a
ﬁxed distance. The yellow bar moves randomly back and
forth across the road. The blue bar is controlled by the
steering wheel and is always in the middle of the
driver’s view. The driver’s task is to keep turning the
steering wheel (and thereby the car) in such a way that
the (narrower) blue bar is centred in the yellow bar as
much as possible (see Figure 2).
The experiment started with a short training block, in
which the diﬀerent tasks (referential communication,
diﬃcult driving, simultaneous driving and communicat-
ing) were practised separately. After the training
session, the eye tracker was calibrated. The actual exper-
iment consisted of two blocks of 30 trials, each assigned
to one of the driving conditions. Half of the participants
got the easy driving condition in the ﬁrst block and the
diﬃcult driving condition in the second. The order was
reversed for the other half of the participants. After the
two blocks were completed, the speaker-passenger and
listener-driver switched roles, and the experiment was
repeated (but with a diﬀerent item list). For all partici-
pant pairs but one, the new listener-driver got the
same order of conditions as the listener-driver before
the role switch. Given that we had 25 pairs, however,
there was one pair in which the ﬁrst listener-driver
got the easy driving condition ﬁrst, and the second lis-
tener-driver got the diﬃcult driving condition ﬁrst. A
schematic representation of the design is presented in
Figure 3.
All speech, both that produced by the speaker-pas-
senger and that produced by the driver-listener, was
recorded using a single, dash-mounted microphone.
Each complete experiment, in which both participants
had been speaker-passenger and listener-driver once,
lasted approximately 1.5 h.
Design and coding
Varying driving condition (easy driving, diﬃcult driving)
as a within-participants factor and role order (speak-
ﬁrst, drive-ﬁrst) as a between-participants factor resulted
in a 2 × 2 mixed design. Block (1, 2) and the number of
minimally required attributes (1, 2) were included as
control factors. The main dependent variable was the
degree of overspeciﬁcation in referential expressions.
Other linguistic measures analysed for the speaker-pas-
senger’s utterances were number of words per descrip-
tion (relative to the number of attributes mentioned),
average word duration, modiﬁer speech rate within over-
speciﬁed descriptions, and speech onset latency. For the
listener-driver, we analysed referent identiﬁcation accu-
racy, identiﬁcation speed, and driving accuracy (steering
deviation).
Only the ﬁrst referring expression in each experimen-
tal trial was considered. Any later adjustments triggered
by listener feedback (55 cases in total) were ignored. We
further excluded descriptions that fell in one of the fol-
lowing categories: descriptions with major (listener)
interruptions or other disturbances (33 cases); descrip-
tions of the wrong image (12 cases); references to
earlier trials or other objects in the scene (11 cases);
attempts at humour or too much creativity (10 cases);
experiment errors (5 cases); descriptions that were not
completed within the time limit (3 cases); and mention-
ing the number of the image (1 case). Finally, any
descriptions using the right number of attributes but
the wrong attribute type (e.g. mentioning colour and
size where colour and orientation are the distinguishing
properties) were excluded (36 cases). These steps




The degree of overspeciﬁcation was determined by
counting the number of redundant attributes in each
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the experimental design.
The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
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referring expression. Any mentioned property that was
not necessary to uniquely identify the referent was con-
sidered redundant (cf. Koolen et al., 2013). For any attri-
bute required for a minimal description that was not
mentioned (i.e. underspeciﬁcation), we subtracted 1
from this number. We ran a cumulative link mixed
eﬀects model on the degree of overspeciﬁcation, using
the ordinal package in R (Christensen, 2015). Cumulative
link models allow for the analysis of ordinal dependent
variables. The initial model included driving condition
(easy driving/diﬃcult driving), role order (speak ﬁrst/
drive ﬁrst), and their interaction as main predictors, and
block (1/2) and minimally required attributes (1/2) as
control predictors. All predictors were centred to
reduce collinearity. We started by ﬁtting a model includ-
ing random intercepts for participants and items, and by-
participant and by-item random slopes for driving con-
dition.3 Next, we used model selection to simplify the
model, starting with removing the random correlations
and removing random components with low variance
(see Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015), and then
removing ﬁxed eﬀects of the control predictors. We
used a Likelihood Ratio test to determine if each
removal was justiﬁed. The main predictors and their
interaction always remained in the model.
Overall, we found a high rate of overspeciﬁcation in
the referring expressions: 55% of referring expressions
were overspeciﬁed, i.e. mentioned at least one attri-
bute that was not required to distinguish the target
referent from the competitors. This ﬁgure is compar-
able to the rate of overspeciﬁcation found in the D-
TUNA corpus (53.6%), which used the same type of
materials (Koolen et al., 2011). Underspeciﬁcation was
very uncommon: Only 0.4% of referring expressions
(9 instances) lacked one or more attributes that were
necessary to distinguish the referent (1.9% when
counting the wrongly speciﬁed referring expressions
that we removed earlier).
We analysed whether the degree of overspeciﬁca-
tion (average number of redundant attributes) was
diﬀerent between the two driving conditions, and
whether this interacted with role order. As there
were very few cases of underspeciﬁcation, we
removed this value from the ordinal response variable.
The ﬁnal model showed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
the minimal number of required attributes (a lower
degree of overspeciﬁcation when two attributes
were already required), but no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
driving condition and role order, and no interaction
between the two (see Table 1). However, inspecting
the data in more detail revealed a marked diﬀerence
between the ﬁrst and the second block of the exper-
iment. Figure 4 illustrates the complex relationship
between block, driving condition and whether the
speaker or the listener role was taken ﬁrst. Block 1
shows a higher degree of overspeciﬁcation in the
diﬃcult driving condition, at least for participants
who drove ﬁrst. In Block 2, this trend seems to be
reversed: Participants who had driven ﬁrst produced
a higher degree of overspeciﬁcation in the easy
driving condition than in the diﬃcult driving
condition.
The pattern in Figure 4 may be explained when we
consider that driving diﬃculty was manipulated block-
wise, i.e. whenever Block 1 had the easy driving con-
dition, Block 2 had the diﬃcult driving condition, and
vice versa. Thus, speakers may have been copying their
referential strategy from Block 1 into Block 2, even
though Block 2 had the other driving condition. This
becomes visually clear when the bars for the easy and
diﬃcult driving conditions are swapped for Block 2, as
was done in Figure 4.
To account for this pattern of results, we ran a post-
hoc analysis in which we added a predictor condition
order, indicating whether the easy or the diﬃcult
driving condition was done ﬁrst. The results in Table 2
show a signiﬁcant positive interaction between con-
dition order and role order. Running paired comparisons
for the interaction revealed that when the speaker had
driven ﬁrst, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of con-
dition order (β = 1.2216; SE = 0.4836; p = .01), conﬁrming
that speakers who had experienced the driving task and
who were presented with the diﬃcult driving condition
as the ﬁrst driving task overspeciﬁed their descriptions
to a greater degree than speakers who had experienced
the driving task but were presented with the easy driving
condition ﬁrst. There was no eﬀect of condition order for
speakers who had not driven ﬁrst (β =−0.1539; SE =
0.3600; p = .67). Because the predictors condition order
and role order both varied only between participants
and between items, the random eﬀects structure for
the model shown in Table 2 only included a by-partici-
pant random slope for driving condition and random
intercepts for participant and item.
Table 1. Cumulative link mixed eﬀect model output for the
degree of overspeciﬁcation. Threshold coeﬃcients are the
intercepts for each of the response categories.
β SE z p
Threshold coeﬃcients
0|1 −0.4816 0.2286 −2.1068 0.0351
1|2 3.7023 0.255 14.5162 <.001***
Coeﬃcients
Driving condition 0.0416 0.1512 0.2753 0.7831
Role order 0.6606 0.4524 1.4603 0.1442
Minimal number of required
attributes
−2.1248 0.3434 −6.1875 <.001***
Driving condition : Role order −0.4258 0.3028 −1.4064 0.1596
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Description length
For description length, we ﬁrst analysed the number of
words in the descriptions, divided by the number of attri-
butes mentioned (including type, and excluding material
following listener feedback). Second, we analysed the
average word duration in seconds within a description.
We used the software package MAUS (http://www.bas.
uni-muenchen.de/Bas/BasMAUS.html) to automatically
ﬁnd the word boundaries in the speech signal based
on the manual transcription. Start and end of each
description were corrected manually. We log trans-
formed both variables to make the data more normally
distributed and ran linear mixed eﬀect model analyses
using the same procedure as described above. Both ana-
lyses showed a small but signiﬁcant eﬀect of minimally
required attributes, with more words per attribute and
shorter word durations in descriptions where two
attributes were minimally required as compared to
descriptions that required the mention of only one attri-
bute (number of words: 2.08 vs. 1.96 words; β = 0.0923;
SE = 0.0404; p = .02; word duration: 0.42 vs. 0.45 s; β =
−0.0534; SE = 0.0185; p = .005). However, there were no
signiﬁcant eﬀects of driving condition, role order, or
their interaction in either analysis (all ps > .05). Rerunning
the analyses with condition order as an additional pre-
dictor yielded very similar results.
Modiﬁer speech rate
Since adaptation eﬀects may manifest themselves more
locally, we also analysed the rate at which both redun-
dant and non-redundant modiﬁers were spoken within
overspeciﬁed descriptions, in syllables per second. The
diﬀerence between redundant and non-redundant
modiﬁers was not statistically signiﬁcant, and there was
no signiﬁcant interaction with driving condition (both
ps > .1). However, there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between driving condition and role order, such that, irre-
spective of modiﬁer redundancy, speakers who had
driven ﬁrst pronounced modiﬁers faster in the diﬃcult
than in the easy driving condition (see Table 3). An analy-
sis including condition order as a predictor did not show
eﬀects of redundancy (p = .47).
Speech onset latency
Next, we analysed the mean latency with which speakers
started their description (in seconds). Again, a log trans-
formation was applied, and linear mixed eﬀect models
Table 2. Cumulative link mixed eﬀect model output for the
degree of overspeciﬁcation with condition order as main
predictor. Threshold coeﬃcients are the intercepts for each of
the response categories.
β SE z p
Threshold coeﬃcients
0|1 −0.4689 0.2202 −2.1298 0.0332
1|2 3.7144 0.2477 14.9977 <.001***
Coeﬃcients
Condition order 0.5402 0.3000 1.8008 0.0717
Role order 0.6347 0.4354 1.4579 0.1449
Minimal number of required
attributes
−2.1240 0.3432 −6.1887 <.001***
Condition 0.0417 0.1543 0.2704 0.7868
Condition order : Role order 1.3520 0.6000 2.2536 0.0242*
Figure 4. Degree of overspeciﬁcation in speakers who described ﬁrst (left) and speakers who had driven ﬁrst (right) by driving condition
and block. For an individual participant pair, if Block 1 had the easy driving condition, Block 2 had the diﬃcult driving condition and vice
versa, as indicated by the swapping of the colours in Block 2.
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were run in the same way as described above. We
hypothesised that speech onset latencies would be
longer if speakers adjusted their descriptions to their
addressee’s level of cognitive load. However, since we
did not ﬁnd evidence for trial-by-trial adaptation, we
instead investigated the eﬀect of overspeciﬁcation in
general on speech onset latency. If overspeciﬁcations
are the result of eﬀortful audience design, we expect
longer latencies for overspeciﬁed descriptions. Alterna-
tively, if overspeciﬁcation is easier for the speaker, we
expect shorter latencies for overspeciﬁed descriptions.
Thus, we ran an analysis including a predictor for the
rate of overspeciﬁation, as well as a predictor for con-
dition order. The ﬁnal model, presented in Table 4,
shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between overspeciﬁed
and minimally speciﬁed descriptions, with shorter
speech onset latencies for overspeciﬁed than for mini-
mally speciﬁed descriptions. This suggests that redun-
dant descriptions were not eﬀortfully selected in order
to accommodate the listener.
Driver’s response and driving accuracy
Finally, we assessed the driver’s accuracy and speed
(response time in seconds) in identifying the correct
object as well as their driving accuracy (deviation
between the steering and the reference bar in
metres). Linear mixed eﬀect models were run for
driving accuracy and response time, and logit mixed
eﬀect models were run for response accuracy. In all
cases, we included rate of overspeciﬁcation in the
description as an ordinal predictor. To correct for the
longer duration of overspeciﬁed descriptions, we
measured response time from the time point where
the description was fully distinguishing (i.e. referential
entropy was zero).
The drivers’ response accuracy was very high, both in
the easy and in the diﬃcult driving condition (98.4% and
97.6% correct, respectively), indicating that the passen-
ger’s descriptions were largely successful and that par-
ticipants were attending to the referential task. There
was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of overspeciﬁcation on response
accuracy (overspeciﬁed vs. minimally speciﬁed: p = .76; 2
vs. 1 redundant modiﬁer: p = .85).
Next, we tested the hypothesis that drivers in the
diﬃcult driving condition would be relatively faster to
identify the correct referent when the description was
overspeciﬁed than when it was not. This hypothesis
was not conﬁrmed: The driver’s response time was not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between descriptions with two
redundant modiﬁers, descriptions with one redundant
modiﬁer, and minimal descriptions (ps > .1).
Finally, there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in steering
performance between the two driving conditions (β =
0.3548; SE = 0.0134; p < .001): Drivers were better at
keeping the bars overlapped in the easy driving con-
dition (when the yellow bar did not move; mean steering
deviation 0.01 m) than in the diﬃcult driving condition
(when it moved randomly across the road; mean steering
deviation 0.37 m), conﬁrming that the diﬃcult driving
condition was indeed more challenging. However,
driving accuracy was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between overspeciﬁed and minimally speciﬁed descrip-
tions (overspeciﬁed vs. minimally speciﬁed: p = .25; 2
vs. 1 redundant modiﬁer: p = .48).
General discussion
In this study, we investigated whether speakers adapt
their referring expressions to the listener when the lis-
tener is noticeably under an increased cognitive load.
Speakers described carefully controlled objects to listen-
ers in a simulated driving context. The listener had to
identify the correct object based on the description,
while performing either an easy driving task involving
little to no steering or a diﬃcult driving task resulting
in extensive steering movements. Based on the
Uniform Information Density hypothesis, we predicted
that speakers would incorporate more redundant attri-
butes (properties of the object that do not need to be
mentioned for a minimal description distinguishing the
object from the other objects in the scene) in their
descriptions in the diﬃcult driving condition as com-
pared to the easy driving condition. In this way, they
Table 3. Linear mixed eﬀect model output for log modiﬁer
speech rate (overspeciﬁed descriptions only).
β SE t p
(Intercept) 1.4526 0.034 42.7242 <.001***
Modiﬁer redundancy 0.0276 0.0343 0.8064 0.4223
Condition 0.0490 0.0159 3.0769 0.0021**
Role order −0.0025 0.0675 −0.0374 0.9703
Modiﬁer redundancy : Condition 0.0301 0.0318 0.9466 0.3440
Modiﬁer redundancy : Role order −0.0107 0.0684 −0.1560 0.8764
Condition : Role order 0.0661 0.0321 2.0601 0.0395*
Modiﬁer redundancy :
Condition : Role order
0.0657 0.0641 1.0248 0.3056
Table 4. Linear mixed eﬀect model output for log speech onset
latency.
β SE t p
(Intercept) 0.8590 0.0366 23.4558 <.001***
Condition order −0.0132 0.0722 −0.1824 0.8561
Role order −0.0877 0.0728 −1.2036 0.2349
Overspeciﬁed vs. minimally
speciﬁed
0.0311 0.0138 2.2568 0.0252*
Overspeciﬁed by 2 vs. 1
attributes
−0.0027 0.0209 −0.1306 0.8965
Condition −0.0049 0.0153 −0.3227 0.7486
Condition order : Role order −0.2705 0.1443 −1.8750 0.0674
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would reduce the overall information density of their
utterances, and hence accommodate listeners under
load by giving them more cues and more time to
process the information. More generally, we predicted
that if speakers aid their listeners by spreading out infor-
mation over more words or over more time, they would
also produce longer descriptions in the diﬃcult driving
condition.
Our results do not conﬁrm these predictions. In line
with earlier studies on overspeciﬁcation in language pro-
duction (e.g. Arts et al., 2011; Engelhardt et al., 2006;
Koolen et al., 2011), we found that mentioning redun-
dant attributes was very common: More than half of all
referring expressions contained at least one redundant
attribute. However, speakers apparently did not use
this redundancy actively as a way to accommodate a lis-
tener under increased cognitive load in our simulated
driving task: They did not adjust the degree of overspe-
ciﬁcation when drivers switched from an easy driving
task to a diﬃcult driving task, or from a diﬃcult driving
task to an easy driving task. Instead, the referential strat-
egy from the ﬁrst block of the experiment seemed to be
copied over and reinforced in the second block, even
though this block had the other driving condition.
More generally, we did not ﬁnd evidence for our hypoth-
esis that descriptions would be longer (on top of the
number of attributes mentioned) in the diﬃcult than in
the easy driving condition. Speakers did not increase
word duration in the diﬃcult as compared to the easy
driving condition either.
However, we did ﬁnd an interesting between-group
diﬀerence in the rate of overspeciﬁcation. Speakers
who had both experienced the driving task ﬁrst and
were presented with the diﬃcult driving condition as
the ﬁrst driving task included more redundant attributes
in their descriptions than other speakers. Although we
only found this eﬀect in a post-hoc analysis, we believe
that it does make some interesting suggestions about
the degree to which speakers adapt their linguistic
choices to their addressees. First, the ﬁnding that the
group of speakers who produced more redundant
descriptions had experienced the driving task them-
selves ﬁrst may suggest that speakers do not automati-
cally adapt their referring expressions to their
addressees, but are only more redundant when they
have compelling evidence that doing so would be
important. This would be consistent with accounts of
language production stating that speakers only take
the listener’s perspective into account when there are
strong cues that adjustment is necessary (e.g. Fukumura
& van Gompel, 2012; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).4 Having
ﬁrst-hand experience of the addressee’s task may be one
of the cues triggering audience design. Hence,
perspective taking in language production may be trig-
gered by quite literally putting yourself in the listener’s
shoes.
Second, the ﬁnding that speakers did not adjust their
level of redundancy between the ﬁrst and the second
block of the experiment, even though the second
block had the other driving condition, might suggest
that descriptions were aﬀected by the driving diﬃculty
at the start of the experiment, but not by a change in
driving diﬃculty halfway through. If this is true, it
would corroborate the view that speakers choose a refer-
ential strategy that takes into account the needs of the
listeners only on a global level and do not continuously
update their beliefs about the listener during interaction.
Many studies have found evidence for global adaptation.
For example, when people repeatedly tell the same story
or refer to the same object, utterances become less
detailed, but less so when they are addressed to a new
person who has not heard the original story or reference
(Brennan & Clark, 1996; Galati & Brennan, 2010). Also,
people describe objects diﬀerently when talking to
friends or insiders than to strangers or outsiders (Isaacs
& Clark, 1987; Krauss & Fussell, 1991). The necessity of
such adaptations is easy to establish for the speaker, as
the addressee’s needs are simple and clear from the
start (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Galati & Brennan, 2010).
In addition, the assessment of the addressee’s needs is
also dependent on the expectations that the speaker
has about the addressee. For example, Kuhlen and
Brennan (2010) found that speakers told jokes with
more detail to attentive addressees than to distracted
addressees, but not when they expected the addressee
to be distracted. Similarly, in the current study, when
speakers expected a mentally loaded addressee, they
may have acted on this expectation irrespective of
whether or not the driving task was actually increasing
the addressee’s cognitive load, which may be why the
order in which the driving conditions were presented
to the participants mattered for the degree of redun-
dancy in their descriptions.
Although this interpretation of our ﬁndings allows us
to maintain that speakers use overspeciﬁcation as a way
to accommodate listeners under load, be it only under
speciﬁc conditions, other task strategies may have
been employed as well. For example, our ﬁnding that
modiﬁers were spoken faster in the diﬃcult than in the
easy driving condition only for speakers who had done
the driving task ﬁrst might point to a diﬀerent audience
design strategy (cf. Arnold et al., 2012; Rosa et al., 2015):
Instead of increasing redundancy and distributing the
information across a longer time period, some speakers
may have employed a strategy in which part of their
descriptions are shortened to not disturb the listener’s
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driving task too much. The fact that speech rate was
similar for redundant and non-redundant modiﬁers
may suggest that the degree of redundancy did not
play a role in this referential strategy.
An alternative interpretation of our ﬁndings could be
that diﬀerences in the rate of overspeciﬁcation are due to
speakers’ own egocentric preferences. As argued by
some researchers (e.g. Arnold et al., 2012; Arnold &
Griﬃn, 2007; Rosa et al., 2015), what may seem like lis-
tener accommodation may in fact be the result of
speaker-internal processes. For example, a diﬃcult
dual-task setting for the addressee may also distract
the speaker, which may hinder her capacity to produce
an appropriate object description, possibly resulting in
increased redundancy. Our results for both speech
onset latency and driving accuracy are also consistent
with an account where speakers’ choices in production
are at least inﬂuenced by speaker-internal processes.
Firstly, we found a signiﬁcantly shorter latency to begin
speaking for overspeciﬁed as compared to minimally
speciﬁed descriptions. A potential explanation is that
speakers who intended to be more redundant followed
a very simple strategy: to just start describing without
paying attention to which modiﬁers were required for
a minimal description. Speakers with such a strategy
could hence begin describing earlier, before they had
completely planned their utterance or even inspected
the full visual scene (see Pechmann, 1989 and Gatt,
Krahmer, Van Deemter, & Van Gompel, 2017 for similar
results). In other words, in experimental setups like
ours, where there is a well-controlled set of attributes
that are manipulated, producing an overspeciﬁed
description may actually be easier in terms of message
planning (even though it is more diﬃcult in terms of
articulatory eﬀort) than producing a minimal description.
This will especially be the case if overspeciﬁcation is part
of a global strategy employed throughout the exper-
iment. Thus, although overspeciﬁcation may have facili-
tated production-internal processes on a trial-by-trial
basis, this does not exclude the possibility that the speak-
er’s decision to use an overspeciﬁcation strategy in the
ﬁrst place is motivated by audience design.
Secondly, we did not ﬁnd evidence that overspeciﬁed
descriptions helped drivers to select the correct referent
more quickly in the diﬃcult driving task. In addition,
driving accuracy did not improve when descriptions
were overspeciﬁed, suggesting that overspeciﬁcation
did not beneﬁt driving performance either. It could be
the case that listening to a longer description impaired
performance on the driving task. It is also possible that
any facilitating eﬀect was countered by an eﬀect in the
other direction: Whenever the driver was having
trouble with the steering task, speakers might have
responded to that by including more redundancy. Our
results are therefore not conclusive as to whether over-
speciﬁcation is beneﬁcial for the addressee or not.
More detailed analyses of individual task strategies are
needed to clarify this issue. For example, in future
research we could analyse listeners’ eye movements to
investigate how their processing of the descriptions
may be aﬀected by increased redundancy (cf. Engelhardt
et al., 2006; Tourtouri et al., 2017). However, even if
increasing redundancy is not helpful for listeners, this
does not preclude the possibility that the use of redun-
dant descriptions is still intended by the speaker to
accommodate the listener.
Although production-internal processes may have
played a role in our study, they are not suﬃcient to
explain our ﬁndings on the rate of overspeciﬁcation.
Most importantly, it is not clear why an increased use
of redundant descriptions for speaker-internal reasons
would only occur in speakers who had done the dual
task themselves ﬁrst and received the diﬃcult driving
condition as the ﬁrst driving task. The order in which
the two driving conditions were presented should not
matter if speakers were only driven by their own prefer-
ences. At this point, therefore, we believe that the most
likely explanation of our data is that speakers at the start
of their description task chose a global strategy to over-
specify their descriptions in order to aid their addressees,
and only did so when it was evident to them that some
adjustment was in order (i.e. when they had experienced
the driver’s cognitive load themselves). To further separ-
ate speaker-internal processes from audience design,
future research could investigate speaker disﬂuencies
and self-repairs in overspeciﬁcations. If speakers overspe-
cify because they are having diﬃculty with the referential
task themselves, one should ﬁnd a higher rate of disﬂ-
uency in these descriptions (cf. Arnold, 2008).
Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of a compar-
able referential communication experiment using the
same furniture stimuli as used in the current study by
Koolen et al. (2011), who did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects
of the communicative setting on the degree of overspeciﬁ-
cation. In one of their conditions, participants produced
written descriptions without an addressee; in a second
and third condition, participants produced spoken descrip-
tions to a confederate addressee, but only in the third con-
dition the speaker and addressee could also see each
other. Koolen et al. predicted that speakers would
produce more redundant attributes in spoken than in
written descriptions, as well as when speaker and addres-
see cannot see each other vs. when they can, arguing that
it is more important to be clear for the addressee when
possibilities for feedback are limited. Although these pre-
dictions were borne out numerically in the data, the
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diﬀerences between the conditions were not signiﬁcant. It
is possible that the cues for the speaker to consider the
addressee’s needs were not strong enough in that study.
In addition, it is not obvious that introducing more redun-
dancy will always increase clarity of the description for the
listener, as overspeciﬁed descriptions may also be more
confusing (e.g. Engelhardt et al., 2006; Sedivy, Tanenhaus,
Chambers, & Carlson, 1999).
In our study, we used a stronger cue for adaptation
than just co-presence of speaker and addressee,
namely the cognitive status of the addressee. We
expected that a noticeably cognitively loaded listener
would be more likely to elicit audience design in the
speaker to secure successful communication. In addition,
we reasoned that an increase in the rate of overspeciﬁca-
tion leads to a decrease in information density, which
may be beneﬁcial for addressees with a reduced proces-
sing capacity. Still, our results suggest that even loading
the addressee with a diﬃcult dual task may not be
suﬃcient to elicit audience design, but that the speaker
apparently also needs to have ﬁrst-hand evidence that
the task is really impeding the capacity to process infor-
mation. Moreover, a chosen strategy may not be easily
abandoned in the absence of clear evidence that it is
not working. Given the listener-driver’s overall high
response accuracy scores, speakers in our study might
not have had a good enough reason to change their
initial referential strategy.
To sum up, our ﬁndings do not seem to be in line with a
strong interpretation of the Uniform Information Density
Hypothesis (e.g. Levy & Jaeger, 2007) in which speakers
distribute information uniformly over their utterances to
ease the processing of that information by their addres-
sees. UID provided us with a clear prediction about
what audience design should look like if it was going to
aid a cognitively loaded listener: A listener whose capacity
for processing incoming linguistic material is clearly com-
promised by the performance of a secondary task will
beneﬁt from a lower rate of transmission of the linguistic
information. Hence, introducing more redundancy that
spreads out the crucial information over more time will
be a good way for the speaker to aid the listener’s linguis-
tic processing. This is not what speakers did in our study:
They did not adapt their degree of redundancy to a
change in the addressee’s cognitive load, nor did they
more generally reduce the information density of their
descriptions, by distributing information over more
words or over more time.
However, our results also cannot be taken as evidence
that speakers do not take into account the cognitive
state of their addressees when choosing referring
expressions. Firstly, the degree and type of listener adap-
tation is likely to be dependent on the speciﬁc task. For
example, compared to the present study, a referential
task in which ﬁnding the correct referent is much more
diﬃcult, or in which the importance of performing this
task correctly is emphasised might elicit stronger adap-
tation eﬀects. Secondly, to the extent that audience
design is cognitively eﬀortful, speakers may have more
cognitive resources available to consider the addressee’s
needs when their own description task is easier. Thirdly,
another factor that might play a role is the predictability
of the referent (cf. Rosa et al., 2015). When the referent is
relatively predictable, speakers may normally use an
informationally dense description, and can then easily
lower the information density when addressee needs
require it. When the referent is not predictable to start
with, speakers are likely to use a lower information
density anyway, and addressee eﬀects may be smaller.
In our study, which object would be described was not
predictable for the addressee, and hence we might
have seen stronger accommodation eﬀects if descrip-
tions would have been more predictable. Finally, and
most importantly, we found that the group of partici-
pants who had experienced the driving task themselves
and who were presented with the diﬃcult driving task
ﬁrst produced more redundant descriptions than other
participants. This behaviour might constitute a referen-
tial strategy involving adjustment to the listener’s
needs at a more global level, and hence is not necessarily
incompatible with rational pragmatic theories of com-
munication such as UID or the Rational Speech Act
model.
Notes
1. These stimuli have been used to collect the English TUNA
(Gatt, Van Der Sluis, & Van Deemter, 2007) and Dutch D-
TUNA (Koolen & Krahmer, 2010) corpora of referring
expression production. One of the goals of the current
research was to create a comparable corpus for
German referring expression production. This corpus is
described in Howcroft, Vogels, and Demberg (2017).
2. Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for
the Neural Basis of Cognition and Department of Psy-
chology, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.
tarrlab.org/. This work is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported License.
3. No random slopes for the predictor Role order were
included, since whether the speaker had described ﬁrst
or driven ﬁrst was manipulated between-participants
and between-items. In addition, random slopes for the
control predictors were not included, as these are con-
sidered non-essential (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily,
2013). Adding them afterwards did not signiﬁcantly
improve model ﬁt.
4. Alternatively, according to Schober (1993), speakers may
only consider the listener’s needs when the listener had
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considered their needs when he was the speaker, as a
kind of quid pro quo arrangement.
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